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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: [IR](#) [JA](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#)
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL INFO ON IAEA PLANS TO FUEL TEHRAN
RESEARCH REACTOR

REF: TOKYO 02331

Classified By: ISN A A/S Vann Van Diepen, Reasons 1.4 B, C, and D

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

[1](#)2. (C) BACKGROUND: During an October 7 briefing with MOFA Officials on the outcome of the 1 October P5 1 meeting in Geneva with Iran (reftels), MOFA Iran Desk Chief Junichi Sumi asked whether the United States could provide additional information that would refute some GOJ experts' contentions that the IAEA's proposal to provide Iran with 19.75% LEU for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) would pose proliferation risks.

[1](#)3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to deliver the following points in response to the Japanese MOFA's request for further information:

BEGIN POINTS:

--The United States and others support the IAEA's proposal because it would respond to Iran's request for fuel for the TRR in a manner that would substantially reduce Iran's available LEU stockpile that could otherwise be enriched further to weapons-grade.

--The provision of finished fuel elements poses far less risk than a situation in which Iran reconfigures its centrifuge cascades to produce LEU enriched to 19.75%, or in which it re-enriches to HEU the LEU that would be removed from Iran under the IAEA proposal.

--Moreover, in order to ensure that no fuel is diverted from its authorized peaceful uses, any fuel elements provided under this agreement would be placed under IAEA safeguards, and therefore subject to strict IAEA monitoring.

-- Additionally, any attempt by the Iranians to divert the fuel elements for non-peaceful purposes would require Tehran to disassemble the fuel elements and convert the special fissionable material back into UF6. Performing this at Iran's declared uranium conversion facility (UCF) at Esfahan) and we are aware of no other UCF in Iran) would require substantial and obvious modifications to the facility to avoid criticality concerns. Such an effort would thus not be technically simple or quick and would likely be detected. And removal of the safeguarded fuel elements from the TRR (needed for conversion regardless of location) would be detected by the IAEA.

--Taking these factors into account, on balance, this project should make a net positive contribution to nonproliferation.

END POINTS

[1](#)4. (U) Please report any substantive response. Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 202-647-7680, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) and Breck Heidelberg (ISN/RA, 202-647-6599, HeidelbergBD@state.sgov.gov) are the POCs for additional

information and follow-up.
CLINTON